

ECA-OAU AND WORLD BANK ANALYSES AND STRATEGIES ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CONVERGING ALTERNATIVES

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1. Introduction: African and Western Views on Africa

The United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UNPAAERD), approved in 1986, is an unusual case of agreement between Industrial Countries (IC) and Developing Countries (DC) on economic analyses and development strategies in an underdeveloped region¹.

The meaning and limits of this convergence can be illustrated by analyzing the following factors:

- alternative views and related social actors;
- dynamics of convergence in the '80;
- extent of convergence achieved in UNPAAERD;
- theoretical meaning and operational environment of convergence²;
- perspectives of convergence.

It is, therefore, important to outline both African and Western views of different social subjects on Africa's condition: as can be noted, such views are linked to differences in social points of observation, accepted value judgement and paradigms. The converging trends between the two alternative views are historically rooted in the early '80s in the Lagos Plan of Action, developed by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) of United Nations and endorsed by the Organisation for African Unity (OAU)³; in the Agenda for Action (also known as Berg Report) prepared by the World Bank (WB); and in their successors⁴. The level of convergence emerges from a comparison between UNPAAERD — adapted from the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) — and real and financial analyses carried out by the World Bank in the mid '80.

1 These kinds of analysis are usually influenced by rules, places of observation and paradigms. See B. Hettne, "Le teorie dello sviluppo e il Terzo Mondo", Asai, Roma, 1986; J. Elguea, "Paradigms and scientific revolutions in development theories", *Development and Change*, 1985, n. 2; A.O. Hirschman "The rise and decline of development economics", in *Essays in trespassing. Economics to politics and beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981 by the same author; G. Caire, "Histoire recette ou histoire méthode. A propos de la problématique rostowienne et des paradigmes dominants de l'économie du développement", *Economies et Sociétés*, 1983, n. 1; P. Dowidar, "Conception du développement et conception correlative du sous-développement", *Economies et Sociétés*, 1983, n. 1.

2 Various meanings of convergence can be identified: a synthesis, or a hybrid, a tactic move in emergency or a hegemony/surrender relation, each of them showing a very different evolution in links between the two views.

3 See OAU, "Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980/2000", Geneva, International Institute for Labor Studies, 1980; World Bank, "Accelerated Development in Sub-saharan Africa: an Agenda for Action", Washington, D.C., 1981.

4 For a detailed list of main reports on Africa by ECA/OAU and WB see Figure 1 below.

In this study the meaning, origins and balanced pattern of convergence are analyzed on a theoretical basis to identify potential perspectives in cooperation between African countries and the international community. A brief review of alternative evaluations on the UNPAAERD and its implementations highlights the perspectives of converging alternatives: a stable convergence or a new divergence.

2. The Roots of a Divergence: Alternative Views, Social Actors and Realization Patterns on Africa

While this study is on "superstructural debates on alternative strategies of development"⁵ in the link events/strategies, it is rooted in structural elements of the African situation: real events, as perceived by development actors and explained according to their theoretical frameworks, are the basic material for both development images and strategies⁶.

In the path from facts to strategies and policy instruments to adapt structures to a changing environment, two fundamental approaches can be adopted. Analysis may be related to:

- action *within* the theoretical structure (quantitative updating)
- action *on* the theoretical structure (realization and qualitative review in case of discrepancies in results)⁷.

The determining factors in choosing strategical priorities are: perspective of observation, theoretical framework and value judgements⁸. In Africa's case, since colonial days, the two main theoretical approaches have been the African view and the Western

5 As expressed in T.M. Shaw, "Toward a political economy for Africa. The dialectics of dependence", McMillan, 1983a.

6 In the World Bank's case, for the links events/perceptions/theories and strategies see F. Bortot, "Continuità e mutamento nell'azione della Banca Mondiale verso i paesi in via di sviluppo: strategie e teorie", *Economia e Banca*, 1986, n. 1; for the links events/perceptions/theories and images see F. Bortot, "L'immagine dello sviluppo: sviluppo di un'immagine. 'Finance and Development', il Fondo e la Banca 1964/85", *Sviluppo*, n. 50, 1987a.

7 The main chances for modifications of theoretical models as rational tools for understanding reality lies then in times of crises.

8 For some theoretical foundations of this approach see A. Marchal, "Prise de conscience, structure et concept de période", *Revue Economique*, 1954, n. 1; G. Myrdal, "L'obiettività nelle scienze sociali", Torino, Einaudi, 1973 e B. Hettne, 1986 op. cit.

view (both special cases for nationalist and internationalist standpoints worldwide)⁹. The *perspective of observation* is not simply geographic — i.e. residence-related — but also theoretical: the African view puts the fundamental priority on Africa, while the Western view implies an interdependent West-led World, of which Africa is only one heterogeneous part. The social subjects of African views are several African leaders of populist and 'Afro-socialist' movements; officers of inter-African organisations (ECA, OAU, African Development Bank, etc.); and even some Western professors, politicians and volunteers for development. In the Western view, the social actors are almost all politicians and businessmen in Industrial Countries (IC), as well as officers with International Organisations under IC control (International Monetary Fund - IMF - and World Bank - WB -, etc.) who are linked with political leaders and the merchant bourgeoisie of 'Afro-capitalist' states¹⁰.

One should note the different ways of perceiving African reality in the two views: while the African view pays constant attention to structural aspects and long-term perspectives, the Western approach shows only intermittent attention to negative shocks (droughts, famines) and is therefore oriented toward a pessimistic fatalism on Africa's perspectives without considering its potentialities¹¹.

The use of alternative *theoretical frameworks* strongly affects both the choice of strategic priorities and socioeconomic interest & value judgements of social subjects. As both alternative theories on Africa (i.e. the African dependence approach and the Western modernisation approach) are based on rational & comparable elements (as per Lakatos's research programmes) and non-rational & incomparable (as per Kuhn's paradigms), rational progress in African studies is possible only in a partial way,

9 Eurocentric versus Afrocentric view is pointed out in I. Wallerstein, "The three stages of African involvement in the world-economy", in P.C.W. Gutkind/I. Wallerstein *"Political economy of contemporary Africa"*, Sage, Beverly Hills/London/New Delhi, 1985 and B. Davidson, *"L'Africa nel mondo contemporaneo"*, Sei, Torino, 1987. For nationalist versus internationalist approach within African and Western views see T.M. Shaw, "Debates about Africa's future: the Brandt, World Bank and Lagos Plan blueprints", *Third World Quarterly*, 1983b, n. 2.

10 For a specific analysis of alternative coalitions on Africa see T.M. Shaw, 1983b, op. cit. that outlines African implications of Brandt Report and compare internationalist coalition focused on mutual interest between IC and DC (Brandt Report and Agenda for Action) with opposite nationalist coalitions focused on self-interest in IC (free market, with no need for special reports) and in DC (Lagos Plan) showing the decline of global negotiations in the early '80s after the Cancun summit and the rise of conflicting approaches in North/South relations. Northern and Southern protectionisms attack both international keynesism in order to maintain or to obtain economic development in global crisis of the late '70s.

11 For a more *trusting* evaluation of Africa's potential see T.M. Shaw 1983a, op. cit., A. Adedeji, "Review of progress on economic recovery and long term development in Africa", *Development: Seeds of Change*, 1987 n. 2-3, and Mani Tese, *"Africa. Valori, problemi, speranze"*, Milano, 1988.

because alternative paradigms often lead to a simple reformulation of the same alternative theories¹².

The choice of theoretical frameworks in turn affects the perception and realization of facts in the African crisis. If analysis is focused on 'balanced growth of external trade' (IMF approach) the crisis may be attributed to a balance of payments deficit: if the key element is 'economic growth' (WB growth-oriented approach) the crisis is a stagnant or declining per capita GDP; if the main issue is providing basic needs (WB poverty-oriented approach) the crisis symptoms that are inquired into are per capita consumption levels of calories, life expectancy index, education and unemployment rates, income distribution shares. If focus is on 'self reliance' (ECA/OAU national-oriented approach), the main indicators of the crisis are the degrees of manageable import sustainability in terms of export, import substitution, currency reserves and food self-sufficiency; if priority is on 'New International Economic Order — NIEO' (ECA/OAU international oriented approach) the crisis is a raising gap in growth rates and income levels between IC and DC — in this case between Western and African countries. There are therefore different and often conflicting views on the size and characters of the African crisis.

The World Bank view on Africa, for example, focuses on the absolute dimension of poverty rather than on relative inequalities at an inter-African level and between IC and Africa: its analyses overlook relative poverty and do not even take equity into account¹³.

Value judgements on Africa in the Western view are traditionally based on a comparison between the 'unsuited barbarian' myth (dichotomy wild Africa/civilized West, see Western way of life supporters), and the 'good savage' myth (dichotomy pure Africa/corrupted West, see critics of affluent society)¹⁴. As for the African standpoint, it reflects a considerable

12 On socioeconomic interests and value judgements in economic analysis see — among others — G. Myrdal, 1973 op. cit., and G. Lunghini, "Sul modo di produzione della scienza economica", in G. Lunghini (a cura di), "Scelte politiche e teorie economiche in Italia 1945-1978", Torino, Einaudi, 1982. For a 'lakatosian' view of development theories and their possible progress see J. Elguea, 1985, op. cit.; for a 'kuhnian' view of development theories and their incompatibility see instead A.O. Hirschman, 1981, op. cit. and P. Streeten, "Changing perceptions of development", *Finance and Development*, 1977, n. 3. Research programmes within conflicting paradigms can only lead to partial progress in economic theory.

13 For a comparative analysis between the absolute-poverty approach of the World Bank under Mc Namara leadership ('economic efficiency and basic needs for human survival') and the relative poverty approach of Third World leaders ('political autonomy with international equity'), where Africa represents a special case, see F. Bortol, 1986, op. cit.

14 An explanation of normative aspects is offered by A.G. Hopkins, "The World Bank in Africa: historical reflections on the African present", *World Development*, 1986, n. 12.

lack of self-esteem stemming from what is perceived as a substantially negative Western judgement on Africa, unlike Western-led IO like IMF and WB, which easily overcome African criticism as inappropriate¹⁵.

The comparison made in this study limits its scope to continental-level analyses and a two-voice debate (ECA/OAU and WB). It does not go into more detailed aspects of sub-regional specificities (climatic condition, historical heritage, ideology, income levels, economic policies), nor does it address a variety of approaches within Western view (neoconservatism, liberal democracy, social democracy) the African view (Afro-capitalism, African socialism, Afro-marxism) and other regional views on the African role in an interdependent economic world (see Japan, East European countries, other DC in Asia and Latin America)¹⁶.

3. The Dynamics of Convergence: Historical Roots

Examining converging trends between ECA/OAU and the World Bank — the main Western-led international development agency — calls for a reconsideration of the original formulation of the two strategies set forth in the Lagos Plan and the Agenda for Action. An analysis of diverging origins and converging evolution under both Plan and Agenda leads to an evaluation of falling divergences in Africa's contemporary studies.

3.1. *From adjustment programmes to development strategies: the paths of African and Western views in the '70s*

Africa's development analysis — like African historiography — is often a battlefield of conflicting interpretations¹⁷.

15 World Bank self-confidence against Third World criticism for its continuous high level efficiency is shown in F. Bortot, 1986, op. cit. IMF replies on criticism are explained in B. Nowzad, "The IMF and its critics", International Finance Section, Princeton University, Princeton, 1981. The low level of self-esteem in African countries emerges from A. Adedeji, "The Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action: five years after", in A. Adedeji/T.M. Shaw, *Economic crisis in Africa*, Boulder Colorado, 1985.

16 For sub-regional factors see B. Davidson, 1987, op. cit.; for colonial heritage see D.K. Fieldhouse, "Black Africa 1945-80. Economic decolonization and arrested development", Allen & Unwin, London, 1983; for ideology see C. Young, "Ideology and development in Africa", Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 1983; for level of income see Berg Report, op. cit.; for type of economic policy see B. Balassa, "External shocks and policy responses in Sub-Saharan Africa 1973/78" *Finance and Development*, 1984, n. 1. For differing Western opinions on Africa see T.M. Shaw, 1983b, op. cit.

17 Some considerations on alternative historiographies on Africa are shown in I. Wallerstein, 1985, op.cit.

Research on African development patterns from the *African point of view* is essentially political, often based on nationalist ideology. It started during the 60s using the structures of postcolonial states for modernization policies. In the '70s the first signs of slowdown and stop in development appeared leading to a reappraisal of panafricanism under the leadership of OAU in the political field and of ECA in the economic field¹⁸.

After the adjustment policies of 1974/75 and the partial recoveries of 1976/79 failed to revive postcolonial growth patterns, a structural strategy of development was deemed to be required at continental level, based on national self-reliance, endogenous and diversified growth, democratization, policies to reduce poverty and unemployment within a regional integration framework (a sharp break with colonial and neocolonial outward-oriented strategies of growth)¹⁹.

Thus, focus shifted to the regional level, with the emerging roles of ECA and OAU based on:

- criticism of orthodox development theories;
- analysis of Western influence on African theories and ways of life;
- search for consensus among African countries;
- cost/benefit analysis of African participation in NIEO.

Special attention was to be paid to the key elements for an endogenous model of development in Africa — transformation of local raw materials into final consumption goods by means of human resources, technologies, services, material and financial commodities. A link between rural and urban sectors in national and sub-regional economies was needed for appropriate market size and returns to scale. The crucial factors for such a development perspective were:

- rediscovery of African potentialities;
- sovereignty over raw materials and their use;

18 For some aspects of African post-colonial states see J. Delpechin, "Stato e potere in Africa: decolorizzazione e controllo della economia", *Politica Internazionale*, 1987, n. 2-3; R. Sandbrook, "Stato e potere in Africa: i fattori politici dello sviluppo", *Politica Internazionale*, 1987, n. 2-3; e G. Rossi, "Stato e potere in Africa: integrazione regionale e continentale", *Politica Internazionale*, 1987, n. 2-3. For a more general analysis see T.M. Shaw, 1983a.

19 A detailed analysis of African post-colonial policies is shown in R.H. Green, "From deepening economic malaise toward renewed development: an overview", *Journal of Development Planning*, 1985, n. 15. For economic policy in the '60s and '70s from African viewpoint see also F. Tana, "Stato e potere in Africa; il difficile inserimento nel sistema internazionale", *Politica Internazionale*, 1987, n. 2-3. The need for a sharp break with colonial model is stressed by T.M. Shaw, 1983, op.cit., A. Adedeji, 1985, op. cit. Adedeji, 1985 also outlines new perspective policies for African countries.

— leading role of government on development planning, focusing on internal market. The origins of the *Western point of view* on contemporary Africa as a specific developing area were rooted in the '70s, with conjunctural financing of IMF to face balance of payment crisis in several African countries after the first oil shock (Oil Facility and Trust Fund). Crisis was then considered to stem from deficit spending budget and its 'crowding out' effects on the private sector: the solution was seen in demand restraint to meet supply by cutting public spending & wages and putting ceilings on external debt & total internal credit in an IC-based model of economics²⁰.

In the '80s, the realization of Africa's uniqueness in development due to its falling per-capita income, together with the failure of IMF adjustment programmes, led to a specific strategy for Africa in Western view. A modified IMF approach was adopted to face the deepening crisis and increasing indebtedness: a greater degree of conditionality, supply-side and demand-cut policies were pooled together to win the challenges of the world market integration to African countries.

The shift from conjunctural to structural approach after the second oil shock led to the World Bank leadership within the agreed division of labour between the two Bretton Woods organizations. Despite the establishment of a special Structural Adjustment Facility for African countries, in the mid '80s IMF became a net financial beneficiary of capital flows from Sub-Saharan Africa: a specific strategy for Africa was then developed by WB²¹.

3.2. *Alternative blueprints of American crisis: Lagos Plan and Agenda for Action*

The most detailed alternative analyses outcome emerging from the two views are the Lagos Plan and the Agenda for Action.

The Agenda for Action is an analytical mid-term report prepared at the request of African

20 For Western (IMF and WB) analyses on African crisis in the '70s see B. Balassa, 1984, op.cit.; for adjustment policies supported by IMF see S. Kanesa Thasan, "The Fund and adjustment policies in Africa", *Finance and Development*, 1981, n. 3; J.B. Zulu/S.M. Nsouli, "Adjustment programs in Africa. The experience with Fund-supported programs 1980-81" *Finance and Development*, 1984, n. 1; R.F. Hopkins, "The politics of adjustment. The African case", *Food Policy*, 1988, n. 2.

21 The origins of the WB strategy for African development are outlined in the general analysis by A.W. Clausen, "Global interdependence in the 1980s" *Finance and Development*, 1982, n. 1 and developed briefly in R.J. Bhatia, "Adjustment efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1980-84", *Finance and Development*, 1985, n. 3. Any detailed analysis by the World Bank is provided in four main reports quoted in Figure 1.

Figure 1
MAIN REPORTS ON AFRICA BY ECA/OUA AND WORLD BANK

ECA/OAU	WORLD BANK
1976 Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order in Africa.	1981 Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action.
1979 Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa.	1983 Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress Report on Development Prospects and Programs.
1979 Monrovia Declaration of Commitment on Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective Self-Reliance in Social and Economic Development for the establishment of a New International Economic Order.	1984 Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action.
1980 Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000.	1986 Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 1986-1990.
1981 Africa's Rapidly Escalating Crisis. Proposals for a Short-term Immediate Programme for Survival.	1989 Africa's adjustment and growth in '80s (with UNDI/')
1983 ECA and Africa's Development 1983-2008: A Preliminary Perspective Study.	1989 Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to durable growth.
1985 Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990.	

UNO, 1986 United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990.

governors within WB's Executive Board, while the Lagos Plan is a long-term analysis (1980-2000) centered on a sectoral policy approach focusing on the concepts of Revised Framework (1975/76), Monrovia Strategy (1979) and Monrovia Declaration (1979).

Aside from several specific analyses on 'Plan versus Agenda', some key elements can be emphasized in an issue/response framework:

- type of crisis: external versus internal;
- roots: declining terms of trade vs poor export performance;
- development strategy: self-reliance vs structural adjustment;
- leadership: public sector vs private sector;
- main sector: industry vs agriculture;
- market size: national/regional vs international;
- trade policy: infant industry protection vs liberalization;

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- level of analysis: continent vs national states;
 - focus: Africa vs Sub-Saharan Africa.

Different analyses of crises and strategies for recovery are obviously outlined in the Plan and in the Agenda²².

According to the Plan, crisis is rooted in falling terms of trade: a state-led self reliance strategy is needed for industrialization of internal market on national and inter-regional ground. According to the Agenda crisis reflects poor export quantities performance, and a private-oriented structural adjustment strategy is required along with a smaller and more efficient public sector, for increased agricultural export specialization in a framework of liberalization policies and exchange rate devaluation within the world economy.

The expected benefits lie in regional integration with partial delinking from international market (Plan) or in comparative advantages of production specialization in an interdependent world (Agenda): the Plan focuses on continental-level production as limited by Western protectionism, while the Agenda focuses on national-level trade patterns, overlooking the impact of IC policies on Africa.

Social coalitions are also different. While the Plan is supported by African populist bourgeoisies to renew nationalist coalition of independence age between urban and rural groups, the Agenda stands for international bureaucrats and private agroexporters in a globalizing world system evidencing individual Newly Industrialized Countries²³.

African countries rejected the Agenda as being opposite to their political wishes. ECA, OAU, African Development Bank and even African WB governors maintained that the Agenda was not consistent with the Plan perspectives, and disagreed with the WB argument that it was a mid-term implementation of long-terms goals under the Plan as a structural adjustment policy for self-sustained development. The African view (productive diversification and regional integration) clashed with the Western view (trade specialization and international integration), showing diverging socioeconomic consequences²⁴.

22 For specific analyses of "Plan versus Agenda" see T.M. Shaw, 1983a op. cit. e 1983b, op. cit., A. Adedeji, 1985, op. cit. and especially R.S. Browne/R.J. Cummings, "The Lagos Plan of Action versus the Berg Report: contemporary issues in African development", Howard University Press, Washington, D.C., 1984.

23 On socioeconomic coalition of alternative views see T.M. Shaw, 1983a op. cit. and 1983b, op. cit. and A. Adedeji, 1985, op. cit.

24 See also Rossi, 1987, op. cit. and Tana, 1987, op. cit.

Moreover, different criteria were used in the Plan and Agenda: Plan sees Africa as a whole geographic entity, while Agenda divides Africa into three distinct regions (North, South and Sub-Saharan), but only Sub-Sahara is actually considered. The reasons were several common socio-economic characteristics of Sub-Saharan countries: small area, external orientation, production specialization, human resource shortage, extensive agriculture, ethnical differences, political instability and tropical climate. Thus other differences are neglected, such as linguistic areas, styles of colonial rule and ecological sub-regions. Somehow the Sub-Saharan criterion seems just a more "neutral" definition for 'Black Africa'²⁵.

3.3. *The path to convergence: the deepening crisis and the need for a joint programme for Africa*

The converging trend in the two alternative views represented a way out of the 'battle of words' between the Plan and Agenda supporters to establish a consensual recovery programme.

The structural bases for this broader consensus were:

- African need for financial resources from IC;
- Western ability to value external factor impact on African crisis.

The theoretical bases for convergence were:

- rational clearing of positions;
- needs for similar short-term policies despite different long-term perspectives.

Especially after the famine/drought emergency in 1984, focus thus shifted from conflictual to cooperative aspects²⁶.

The common goal of balanced external trade unified export-oriented and import-substitution policies, and efficiency in food product distribution was now seen as a vital element for food self-sufficiency. Contrasting analyses were limited to timing of policies and speed of structural change: WB favoured a price policy in a context of supply flexibility response, while ECA stood for a structural policy within a supply bottlenecks environment²⁷.

25 For a criticism on Sub-Saharan limits to Africa see A.G. Hopkins, 1986, op. cit. The WB reasons are explained in the Agenda for Action.

26 The new consensus on Africa in the mid '80s emerges in both points of view: see A. Adedeji, 1985, op. cit., T.M. Shaw, "African Development and the New International Division of Labour", in A. Adedeji/T.M. Shaw, "Economic crisis in Africa", Boulder/Colorado, 1985 and — for Western view — S. Please, "Summary and highlights of the World Bank Joint Action Programme", *Journal of Development Planning*, 1985, n. 15.

27 See S. Please, 1985, op. cit. and C. Colclough, "Modelli rivali e mancanza di prove nell'analisi dello sviluppo in Africa", in *Rapporto Subsahara*, Asai, Roma, 1986 for a criticism of ideological theories on African crisis.

Convergence was achieved through diplomatic/political negotiations, a renewed cooperative North/South approach among African countries and a poverty-oriented approach within the World Bank²⁸.

The ECA analysis of African development perspectives 1983/2008 outlined two different scenarios of historical trend (export orientation) and normative trend according to Lagos Plan (self-reliance). Projections on population, education, employment, food and energy showed an increased external orientation, with a sharp dependence on food import and capital goods and a need for deep auto-centric reorganisation.

The 1984 crisis (drought, desertification, natural disasters in 36 out of 50 countries) urged the implementation of the emergency plan formulated in 1981 as an integration of the Lagos Plan on Africa's Rapidly Escalating Crisis. The main points in the emergency plan were:

- support of Lagos analyses on food and drought;
- reaffirmation of Monrovia strategy on food self-sufficiency and fight against desertification;
- emergency management to face hurdles on long-term Plan implementation;
- support by international community to counter long-term trend of falling Official Development Aids (ODAs).

An updating of Plan strategy was proposed in the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) and its two main claims:

- i) international conference on external debt to investigate IC role in debt crisis (which failed to take place as it was not agreed upon in case-by-case approach of IC);
- ii) summoning of a United Nations Special Session on Africa (which resulted in UN-PAAERD)²⁹.

From Western viewpoint, in its Progress Report the WB toned down its endogenous analysis of crisis. African criticism and further deepening of crisis led to a main revision of views on Africa in the Joint Programme (JP 1984) and Financial Adjustment with Growth (FAWG, 1986).

28 See A. Adedeji, 1985, op. cit. for the African view; for the Western view see World Bank evolution in the '80s — with a special role for Subsaharan Africa — in F. Bortot, "L'aggiustamento strutturale nella Banca Mondiale. Strategie finanziarie e istituzionali negli anni '80", *Il Risparmio*, 1988, n. 6.

29 See A. Adedeji, 1985, op. cit.; details on APPER 1986/90 are also given in B.W. Mutharika, "Special assistance needs for Africa, with special reference to sub-Saharan Africa", *Development: Seeds of Change*, 1987, n. 2-3.

A comparison of these reports with the UNPAAERD (African traced) has been carried out in this study to determine the extent of convergence³⁰.

4. The Extent of Convergence: a Comparative Analysis between UNPAAERD and mid '80s World Bank Programmes

The extent of convergence achieved can be tested by comparing the UN Programme with the two contemporary WB analyses on real and financial aspects of African situation (JP & FAWG).

The comparison criteria are as follows:

- realization (symptoms);
- theoretical review (origins);
- normative prescriptions (strategic priorities);
- specific policies (operational instruments).

Areas of dissent can thus be highlighted whose relevance must be evaluated to focus the real size of UN consensus between IC and African countries.

4.1. African crisis: symptoms, roots and priorities according to United Nations and World Bank

The most evident symptoms of African crisis are drought and famine (which threaten the survival of millions of people), the fragility of African social structures (UNPAAERD) and the declining per-capita income and per-capita food production within an increasingly population growth (WB)³¹.

While crisis is seen as structural in both analyses, a different light is cast on the role of external factors in originating it.

Endogenous-factor analyses show a wide convergence. Factors such as inefficient use of resources, urban/rural bias with high cost/low prices for agricultural suppliers, inequalities

30 See S. Plese, 1985, op. cit. and World Bank staff, "Progress Report on Africa development", *Finance and Development*, 1984, n. 1, for brief comments. The position of the World Bank on Africa in the mid '80s is described in Progress Report (1983), Joint Program of Action (1984) and Financial Adjustment with Growth (1986) — Figure 1.

31 The figures of African performance are very disappointing: per-capita income in 1983 is 96% of per-capita income in 1970, food import rise upto 25% of internal consumption and population growth is 3% according to WB/JP.

in income distribution due to lack of infrastructures, inputs, rural services, political stability, trade structures and professional training are commonly acknowledged. Other endogenous but often unmanageable variables (population growth, drought and desertification, immigration of political and ethnical refugees from other countries) have also been considered.

Exogenous-factor analyses, on the contrary, diverge sharply. The WB shows only the reduced flow of ODAs and its linkage with IC priorities, while African countries in UNPAAERD emphasize the high relevance of the international economic environment, where ODA policies and debt rescheduling play only a minor role.

The crucial factors in African crisis —aside from sudden and generalized worsening in African economic management during the '80s — are the IC recession in the early '80s with the resultant decline in DC exports, falling terms of trade for agricultural products, high level of interest rates in IC with an increasing burden of DC debt and raising protection in IC commercial policies versus DC.

Strategic priorities do not seem so diverging (Fig.2): both analyses focus on urban/rural bias, agricultural production and distribution, human resources, management and institutional reforms, deforestation, basic human needs, devaluation, aid management and debt rescheduling. The ranking of priorities is, however, different: UNPAAERD highlights agriculture and related sectors, drought and desertification problems, human resources, popular participation — especially feminine —, aid and debt relief, while WB reports evidence bias arising from currency overvaluation, urban/rural unbalances, public sector ineffectiveness and infrastructural decay due to lacking maintenance along with aids and debt rescheduling.

The common goal of African recovery is thus defined in different ways: the different ranking of agreed priorities conceals the different pattern of desired development. Whereas African countries still claim autocentric development with food self-sufficiency, based on internal demand and regional integration (and which geographical and cultural specificities acting as incentives rather than as restraints), the World Bank sees African perspectives in a world market integration founded on agricultural comparative advantages, without the need for a NIEO.

4.2. African crisis: operational tools for recovery and development

Policies, projects and strategies are target-based. Their review requires a detailed analysis of operational tools in UNPAAERD and in the mid '80s WB programmes.

Figure 2

ELEMENTS FOR A COMPARISON BETWEEN UNPAAERD AND WB PROGRAMS IN THE MID '80s (WB/JP and WB/FawC): STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

strategic priorities:	UN program	WB Programs (mid '80s)
national	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + agriculture + agriculture related sectors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — agri/food industries — transport and communications — commerce and finance + drought/desertification + human resource quality + socioeconomic reforms: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — economic management — other: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> = devaluation = debt relief = labour cost reduction + population planning + popular participation + women's role 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + agricultural productivity + correction of overvaluated currencies + correction of urban/rural bias favouring agriculture versus forced industrialization + human resource qualification (education, health, training, voluntary service) + efficient economic management + public sector rationalization + infrastructure maintenance + population planning
sub-regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + environment (Sahel) + insulation (insular and internal Africa) + actions against South Africa destabilization (Austral Africa) + balance of payments crisis + refugees' cost 	
regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + increasing cooperation 	
universal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + common engagement for development, not for adjustment + better cooperation + IC more oriented towards world-wide development + support for African reforms + debt relief 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + aid coordination between IC without tied-aid + special aids for countries engaged in structural adjustment policies + debt relief

4.2.1. *Sectoral policies and their financing (UNO)*

In the United Nations Organisation (UNO) Programme detailed economic measures are given for each priority sector which include financial needs for the five-year horizon 1986-90.

Agriculture calls for 57.4 billion US dollars to finance investment & rehabilitation programmes, restore arable lands and establish profitable production prices & sustainable input prices (for fertilizers and farm tools) as well as capital goods prices (for farm machines) by means of facilities in credit terms. Actions are also needed for human resource training in agriculture (with a special role for women); diffusion of agronomic research; development of livestock breeding; improving condition of production (irrigation, fight against drought and deforestation) and distribution of agricultural products (transport and communications); and aid programmes for peasants.

Agriculture-related sectors need 60.1 billion USD to develop programmes for backward and forward sectors of agro-industrial complex, including induced activities and technical formation, renewable energies, road and railway maintenance, financial markets coordination at national-subregional-regional levels in view of a future African Monetary Fund.

Fight against drought and desertification & environment protection programmes forecast a 3.41 billion USD expenditure in 1986/90 for reforestation measures, hydric resources management, ecosystems defense, development of firewood-substituting energies, dune stabilization, arrest of soil erosion and salinization according to the UN Plan against desertification approved in 1977.

Human resources increase programmes require 7 billion USD to adapt educational systems to social emerging needs, enhance alphabetization and social participation of youths and women in rural areas and reduce brain drain and dependency on foreign technicians, while improving local work condition.

Other *political and economic reforms* require 0.2 billion USD for incentives to private sector and structural adjustments in public sector enterprises and public services (micromanagement); internal saving mobilization measures (thus avoiding capital flight and resources waste) and improvements in financial management, aids management and debt management (macromanagement). An important role is played by redistributive policies, human resources & popular participation measures and sound local enterprises and institutions.

Thus, UNPAAERD requires a funding of 128.1 billion USD for the period 1986/90:

— 82.5 billion USD available in Africa;

— 45.6 billion USD from external flows, that means for IC an annual average flow of external aid of 9.1 billions.

An annual debt service of African countries is expected to rise from 14.6 to 24.5 billions during the aforesaid period, global external resources need (aid, debt relief) is growing from 23.7 to 33.6 billion USD each year.

External resources policies call for IC action to foster: speedy endowment; support to structural adjustment programmes; technical and financial assistance (especially against drought and desertification); priority for Low Income Countries (LICs); depoliticization of ODAs (preferably multilateral); change in IMF with a widening shares/longer term lending/less conditionality context; and African-oriented VIIIth replenishing of IDA resources to avoid net benefits for IC from repayments. In order to cope with the heavy indebtedness of Africa a conversion of ODA funds into grants and of other official lendings into concessional flows is needed involving various years' grace, 30/40 years maturity and debt renegotiation with a fixed maximum interest rate, in a continuous and ordered resources flows.

All of these policies must be implemented in association with IC own economic policies to improve international economic climate, while expansionary & anti-protectionist policies, international agreements on basic products & buffer stocks (along with compensative financing facilities and incentives for tropical agricultural products at GATT level) are required to stabilize export prices.

An *evaluation of programme implementation* is to be made by a joint committee of donor IC and DC governments (including the IO involved) to ensure constant monitoring of evolving economic situation and recognize political autonomy of DC as sovereignty on national economic resources and as freedom of choice among various types of economic, political and socio-cultural systems³².

4.2.2. *Instruments in joint programme and financial adjustment with growth (World Bank)*

World Bank's JP & FAWG emphasize the economic implications of priority choices, with reference to specific cases of various African countries.

Structural adjustment — indispensable for growth revival — calls for programmes adaptable to changing situations but rigorous in reducing public spending, with price and in-

32 See "United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990", New York, 1986, also known as UNPAAERD.

stitution policies aimed at more efficient use of resources (better use of existing production capacity and use of new resources). Economic restructuring require in particular for the three major reforms of correction of exchange rate overvaluation, reduction of urban/rural gap and public sector rationalization.

The *correction of exchange rates* tends to reestablish balance of payments equilibrium by favouring agricultural exports, while negatively affecting consumption goods imports. Devaluation is an important factor in *reducing the urban/rural gap* as it favours rural producers against urban wage earners by making it possible to raise agricultural prices in local currency (without losing international market shares) and reduce real wages' purchasing power. Rural producers benefit from this strategy both in relation to export and to import-substitution food. Furthermore, a *price policy reform* is needed to overcome the disincentive gap for peasant (low production prices/high production costs) while a structural policy reform is required in services for agriculture (commerce, transport, agricultural education, rural services) to replace state-monopolistic systems of transport and distribution of agricultural products by more efficient mixed private/public systems in conservation of perishable food products.

Public sector rationalization focuses on smaller size and greater efficiency in resource management, with special attention to maintenance expenses in order to avoid decline in services quality. Public enterprises are to be reorganized by shutting down, privatization, restoration strategies favouring private sector in financing and in reemployment of dismissed public sector workers. The focus is then on small but incisive projects within a decentralization context in which private sector and non governmental organisations carry out a fundamental role in formation and motivation³³

Financial adjustment requires the restoration of the import capacity of 1980/82; that means 28.5 billion USD each year in 1986/90 plus 6.8 billion USD for interest payment on Sub-Saharan African debt. The sources of the 35.3 billion USD needed each year to arrest declining per-capita consumption trend are:

- 20 billion USD from export earnings;
- 2 billion USD from financial non-concessional flows (bank and IMF lending, direct foreign investments)
- 2.3 billion USD from debt reschedulings;
- 8.5 billion USD from approved official aids.

33 See World Bank, "Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: a Joint Program of Action", Washington, D.C., 1984 (WB/JP).

An additional financing of 2.5 billions is needed from foreign sources to be obtained from multilateral IOs (VIIIth replenishing of IDA, Trust Fund sources by IMF for 1 billion) and from bilateral ODAs and debt relief (1.5 billion). The problems is less severe for middle income countries (MICs) whose balance of payments deficit of 1-3 billion USD can be financed through lending on international capital markets.

The role of *external resources* is thus crucial; ministers of planning and finance have usually low power on external resource management, because foreign aids are often tied to IC priorities rather than to DC priorities. A real cooperation between donor IC and beneficiary DC involves ODA from IC - beyond any geostrategic linkage - within DC priorities and sectoral programmes, letting IC establish the size and type of aid (financial, food, debt relief) and guarantee the stability of financial flows to DC. Institutional development and private-oriented laws in DC favour the inflow of capital from IC, also encouraged by international insurance institutions such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, established under WB leadership)³⁴.

IC aid has to be continuous, coordinated among donors and focused on debt relief to support structural adjustment programmes, with wide consensus from both IC and DC. Consensus is made possible by increasing realization and pragmatism of Africa, countries after Lagos, with a revaluation of market, private sector and price roles versus large and inefficient public monopolies and forced industrialization pattern against agriculture³⁵.

4.3. *Alternative financial programmes and common operational tools.*

The UNO and WB recovery programmes include financial elements that are not comparable because of the different territories considered (Africa versus Sub-Saharan Africa) and of the different objectives on which attention is focused (recovery of production in UNPAAERD, reestablishment of import capacity in FAWG) in the same time span (1986/90). The implementation of UNPAAERD requires 25.62 billion USD per year:

- 16.52 billions from Africa
- 9.10 billions from external sources

34 For an explanation of the role of MIGA (established in 1985, operative in 1988) in WB strategy see F. Bertot, "Una polizza multilaterale per lo sviluppo. La Banca Mondiale e la Miga", *Economia e Banca*, 1987b, n. 3.

35 See World Bank, "Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 1986-1990", Washington, D.C., 1986 (WB/FAWG) for details.

plus an annual amount of debt service raising from 14.6 to 24.5 billion USD entirely from external aid or debt relief.

The implementation of FAWG calls for 35.3 billions USD per year:

- 20.0 billions from Africa (export earnings)
- 11.0 billions from external aids
- 2.0 billions from external non-concessional sources
- 2.3 billions from debt relief.

However, the two analyses share a variety of operational measures which are indispensable for 'economic sustainability' of import recovery (WB) and for an autocentric strategy of development founded on stabilization, productive rehabilitation, restoration and renewed growth notwithstanding the different approaches to debt service in the two programmes.

An analysis of *operational tools* shows a common choice of instruments, along with specific and different emphases on each. While the UN Programme highlights such aspects as income distribution, popular participation, public efficiency, African regional cooperation and external aid evidencing incentive role against structural bottlenecks, the WB programmes emphasize the relevance of micro and macroeconomic management, incentives (mainly prices) for private sector, income distribution problems and external aid.

Convergences and differentiations are also found when investigating the positions of the two analyses on the controversial areas pointed out by Green³⁶:

- efficiency;
- prices;
- protection of vulnerable groups;
- population;
- savings and investments;
- employment;
- supply and demand management.

UNPAAERD indicates the need for a supply-side strategy enhancing dynamics efficiency through savings mobilization, measures against capital flight and structural policies to increase food production above population growth and contain labour cost while maintaining employment levels and safeguarding vulnerable groups from market pauper-

36 See R.H. Green, 1985, op. cit.

ization. WB's JP and FAWG focus on a supply-side strategy (against short-term demand management policies of IMF) involving efficient use of resources and market prices as incentives to private sector, with drastic employment cuts and population control policies tempered by 'human face adjustment' to defend vulnerable groups from social cost of restructuring.

Convergence on a number of aspects (crisis roots, strategic priorities and operational tools) does not prevent focus on two different perspectives of Africa: internal integration within a NIEO environment versus internal fragmentation within a world interdependence IC-led in the ruling IEO.

5. Theoretical Meaning and Operational Environment of Convergence: African Crisis Theories and Paradigms

The convergence between ECA/OAU and WB programmes lies in their theoretical foundations. An examination of their variance from UNPAAERD shows the theoretical meaning of convergence: synthesis or hybrid, tactic move in emergency or hegemony/sur-render relation between IC and African countries.

5.1. *Alternative analyses on African crisis*

The most dramatic symptoms of African crisis in the '80 were: arrested growth, declining per-capita income, increasing indebtedness and socio-environmental disasters (drought, famine, desertification). In this context, the period between the two oil crisis — with their various effects on different African countries — can be seen as the beginning of crisis or the last stage of a slow growth³⁷.

According to alternative analyses, the origins of crisis lie in the following factors:

- action of a modernization coalition (urban groups and rural elites) emerging from the break of nationalist coalition for independence, with agrarian policies against rural producers and against agricultural production³⁸;
- massive public indebtedness, exchange rates overvaluation and low level of

37. For an evaluation of 1974/79 period as the beginning of crisis see Berg Report and as the last stage of slow growth see R.H. Green, 1985, op. cit.

38. See R. Bates "Markets and States in Tropical Africa. The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies", Cambridge, 1981 and "Essays on Political Economy of Rural Africa", Cambridge, 1983.

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- agricultural prices due to priority of needs over efficiency in decolonization phase³⁹;
 - modernization and growth policies without equity concerns within increasing internationalization of capitalistic system, with different internal social coalitions and different strategies of development among African leaders⁴⁰;
 - external shocks (oil, interest rates, IC recession) and reduced power to control internal economic policy due to supply breakdown resulting from balance of payments deficit⁴¹;
 - new stage of African incorporation in the world-economy, with increasing disintegration of subsistence agriculture and peripheralization of post-colonial Africa⁴²;
 - contradiction between traditional values and colonial structures in post-colonial states, end of national populist coalition between Western-oriented elites and rural masses, emerging of social question within colonial mode of production founded on dualism between export agriculture (capitalistic) and subsistence agriculture (reserve of labour force and low price wage-goods)⁴³.

Analysis of the role of ideology, even though important in outlining different horizons of development, merely shows that growth and inequalities are higher in Afro-capitalistic states than in populist-socialist and Afro-marxist ones⁴⁴.

These different interpretations are based on specific elaboration of the two specular theories of modernization and dependence, involving some aspects of development economics and world-system analysis⁴⁵.

5.2. Theoretical roots of alternative paradigms: economic efficiency versus national political autonomy

Different analyses of the role of external and internal factors in African crisis display alternative theoretical roots of African and Western views within UNPAAERD and JP & FAWG.

39 See D.K. Fieldhouse, 1986.

40 See T.M. Shaw, 1983a and T.M. Shaw, "African Development and the New International Division of Labour", in A. Adedeji/T.M. Shaw (editors) "Economic Crisis in Africa", Boulder/Colorado, 1985.

41 See R.H. Green, 1985.

42 See I. Wallerstein, 1985.

43 See B. Davidson, 1987.

44 See C. Young, 1983.

45 Modernization analyses include those by Bates and Fieldhouse, while Shaw and Davidson evidence dependence analyses; aspects of development economics are shown by Green and elements of world-system analysis are highlighted by Wallerstein.

The World Bank approach is centered on the paradigm of modernization (underdevelopment from internal backwardness, to be fought through opening to international market), while the ECA/OAU approach is based on development economics and dependence paradigms (underdevelopment as historical, colonialism-related process, to be fought through food self-sufficiency policies in cooperation/conflict with IC): the IEO is perceived as a datum by WB and as a modifiable element by ECA/OAU.

Thus differences in analyses are explained. WB shows the lack of relevance for food self-sufficiency and African cultural identities due to selected priority (efficiency) and level of analysis (world economy): a productive economic structure within a framework of comparative advantages favours the inflow of currency needed for food import. In UNPAAERD, the focus on economic efficiency is limited by the principle of national political autonomy: internal markets and African regional integration institutions should be established before opening to international markets, in order to restrain the impact on Africa of IC economic policies and export instabilities in both size and price.

Analysis of the role of internal factors (rural/urban gaps, income distribution, desertification/drought link, IC/DC cooperation, joint price/structural policies in agriculture, reduced/restructured role of state sector) shows a partial convergence of the modernization and dependence theories by means of more recent theories including redistribution with growth, basic needs, eco-development and interdependence in the world-system developed in the late '70s. Such convergence makes the dualism between internal factors/external factors interpretation of the African crisis less sharp.

This convergence however does not cancel some continuous differences. New development theories have a dual side, showing their affiliation to modernization or dependence paradigms: income inequalities are resolved with surplus redistribution (modernization) rather than with global income redistribution (dependence); basic needs are viewed as material (level of food, health, education, housing), not as socio-cultural ones; interdependence is seen as technical interconnection or a socioeconomic structural linkage; self-reliance is simply a case of balance of payments equilibrium or rather productive autonomy in strategic sectors; and eco-development implies non-exportability of IC energy consumption pattern into DC or the need for a world-level revision of energy-intensive IC models of growth⁴⁶.

World Bank's poor interest in international factors of crisis (with the exception of aids)

46 For a fundamental analysis of Third World development theories see B. Hettne, 1986.

indicates a lack of belief in the realism of the IEO proposed changes: within the present world system structure, African countries adjustment must go on tackling exclusively internal factors. UNPAAERD analysis, for its part, expresses the underground request from African countries for a NIEO jointly with the acceptance of structural internal reforms.

5.3. *Toward convergent paradigms: human survival, basic needs, agriculture-oriented industrialization and world level restructuring*

A crucial role in theoretical convergence trend was played by the drought/famine emergency in 1984, which called once more the attention of the Western public opinion on African crisis and its more tragic aspects, evidencing IC solidarity and laying the foundations for a human basic needs consensus to avoid the return of emergency.⁴⁷

In the WB context — owing to the social cost of adjustment policies — poverty-oriented approach emerged again reviewing Mc Namara's emphasis on fight against absolute poverty (in the late '70s) rather than on growth-oriented strategy according to a trickle down approach to poverty. The revival in development economics stopped the hegemony of marginalistic approach in the early '80s, encouraging theoretical convergence on local, national, regional and world level basic human needs⁴⁸.

The main attempts at synthesis were made by Streeten (inside and outside World Bank),

47 For the shocking emergency of African drought/famine crisis in 1984 on Western public opinion see K. Rogal/R. Wilkinson/R. Thomas/P. Mc Killop, "Can Black Africa be saved? The worst drought in a century is only the beginning of continent's woes", *Newsweek*, 19/11/1984 and H. Ng'weno, "Africa seems destined for misery", *Newsweek*, 19/11/1984. For an appreciation of IC emergency solidarity see A. Adedeji, 1985 and 1987.

48 The reprise of poverty-oriented approach in the World Bank in the mid '80s is shown in Bortot, 1988. The basic needs approach in Mc Namara years is well explained in P. Streeten, "From growth to basic needs", *Finance and Development*, 1979, n. 2, H.B. Chenery, "Poverty and progress: choices for the developing world", *Finance and Development*, 1980, n. 2, N.L. Hicks, "Is there a trade-off between growth and basic needs?", *Finance and Development*, 1980, n. 2 e W. Clark, "The Mc Namara years", *Finance and Development*, 1981, n. 2. For the marginalistic approach within World Bank see D. Lal, "The misconception of 'development economics'", *Finance and Development*, 1985, n. 2, faced by P. Streeten, "A problem to every solution. Development economics has not failed", *Finance and Development*, 1985, n. 2. The roots of possible theoretical convergence are laid by J. Amuzegar, "International growth, equity and efficiency", *Finance and Development*, 1978, n. 1 and H. Santa Cruz, "The three tiers of 'basic needs' for rural development", *Finance and Development*, 1979, n. 2.

who investigated development problems pragmatically by analyzing selective links between IC and DC, influence of export-oriented versus import-substitution strategies of development and socioeconomic relations between rural producers and urban consumers.

ODA from IC were needed to foster potential convergence and favour national paths to development based on collective self-reliance of DC within a basic needs (BN) approach for human development in a NIEO context founded on self-reliance and political autonomy⁴⁹.

Synthesis between BN and NIEO proved, however, difficult because of the different subjects involved (individuals and nations), the level of analysis (micro and macroeconomics), group of countries (LICs for BN, MICs for NIEO), claims (aids or trade), social supporting groups (marginal rural/urban groups versus ruling classes of DC). The link needed between a BN programme in a NIEO context (to avoid a transfer of resource from IC poor to DC rich) and a NIEO programme in BN strategy (to avoid pauperization effects in DC) called for a specific study of different dimensions of development — rural, national and international — as evidenced in the UNPAAERD⁵⁰.

Agriculture-led strategies of development emerge both from the Western view (Adelman) and the African view (Amin): industrialization is viewed not as opposite to but as supporting agriculture, contrary to historical models of rural surplus extraction. Both views stress the worldwide need for radical change in agricultural policies, both in DC and IC to the world food order by relating incentive-based agricultural surplus in IC to food deficit in DC; structural adjustment is to be symmetrical to achieve a more balanced and equitable IEO.

49 The attempted synthesis by P. Streeten is founded on pragmatic comparison of alternative views and choices on changing environment in his articles in 1977, 1979 and 1985. Major contributions to this synthesis are "Basic Needs and the New International Economic Order", *Mondes en Développement*, n. 39, 1982a, "A cool look at 'outward looking' policies", *The World Economy*, 1982b, n. 2, and "Food prices as reflections of political power", *Ceres*, 1983, n. 2. However, articles supporting NIEO and inward-looking policies together with BN and export-orientation are published outside World Bank's Finance and Development. Problems and prospects with NIEO are shown in J. Bhagwati, "The New International Economic Order. The North/South debate", Cambridge, MIT Press, 1976.

50 See also P. Streeten, 1982a, Amuzegar, 1978 and H. Santa Cruz, 1979. The acknowledgement of the importance of self-reliance within a BN/NIEO context put some similarities to African view analysis by S. Arrin, "Self Reliance and the New International Economic Order", *Monthly Review*, 1977, n. 7, however outlined from a very far marxian point of view (uneven development).

Despite different theoretical origins, the attempts to get over unilateral models has laid the foundation for new—even if fragile—consensus⁵¹.

5.4. *Toward convergent analyses: prices, structures, external and internal factors.*

In African analyses, convergence emerges from positions that are often artificially discrepant: marginalistic studies of prices and private sector combine with structural analyses focusing on a wider role for public sector to correct market failures in DC (supply bottlenecks, currency scarcity, land monopolistic ownership, market imperfections). Convergence has resulted in marked-oriented structural adjustment policies involving specific price measures. Similarly, the sharp contrast between external factors and internal economic policies which originated African crisis was counteracted by the mutual influence of economic policies and the degree of economic openness. Africa appears to be relatively inward-looking but extremely vulnerable to external shocks, and export-promotion & import-substitution policies are not alternative but rather complementary in diminishing vulnerability to external factors. Export instability, however, affects internal savings and use of capital with increasing indebtedness and arrested investment for development. External shocks — in a context of limited power of internal economic policies — origin inappropriate policies and oversized public sector to increase control on events⁵².

In agricultural-price policy, the conflicting interests of urban/rural relations between small farmers and urban poor can be conciliated by modifying distributive channels to reduce the gap between producer prices and consumer prices. A reformist coalition with urban and rural poor can lead to a subsidy for urban consumers from mineral resources taxation without damaging incentives on agricultural production. Devaluation policy as a redistributive instrument favouring rural sector and recovering production is applicable

51 African views on agriculture-led development are reviewed by S. Amin, "An alternative strategy for development: industrialization in the service of agriculture", *Ceres*, 1981, n. 5 and "Lo sfruttamento dei contadini del Terzo Mondo", *La Questione Agraria*, n. 11, 1983, while Western views are examined by I. Adelman, "Crisi dei modelli di crescita trainata dalle esportazioni: un nuovo ruolo per l'agricoltura", *La Questione Agraria*, n. 21, 1986. For appropriate agricultural policies worldwide see H. Friedmann, "La politica economica dell'alimentazione. La nascita ed il crollo dell'ordine alimentare internazionale del dopoguerra", *Sviluppo*, n. 42, 1982 for Third World view and A. Ray, "Trade and pricing policies in world agriculture", *Finance and Development*, 1986, n. 3, for World Bank view.

52 For a theoretical path of convergence versus opposite ideologies see C. Colclough, 1986 and P. Guillaumont, "Fattori esterni e politica economica nell'Africa subsahariana", In *Rapporto Subsahara*, Asai, Roma 1986.

only if widespread political consensus is available to avoid inflationary sprint among social groups or authoritarian reduction of urban wages⁵³.

The meaning of convergence between ECA and WB analyses in the UN Session does not lie in African surrender of Lagos self-respect, but in consensus based on emergency and mutual goodwill from both IC and African countries⁵⁴. The aim of achieving permanent synthesis through simultaneous internal and international reconfiguration has failed so far because of IC unwillingness to reform IEO and preference for changes in market-led international division of labour.

Convergence has proved a hybrid one: theoretical and operational consensus founded on different roots may lead to different perspectives after emergency situations agreements.

6. Perspectives of Convergence: UNPAAERD Implementation and Recent Developments

We are now at the end of the five-year period 1986/90, four years after the UN Special Session on Africa; it seems appropriate to outline a few recent developments in African debate.

6.1. Alternative evaluations of UNPAAERD

UNPAAERD was the result of an agreement between African countries and IC: a commitment to economic reform and restructuring in exchange for external financial resources by means of ODAs and debt relief.

The real significance of this agreement lies in African analyses and programmes con-

53 For urban/rural price relationship at local level see P. Streeten, 1983, and in African context see R. Bates, 1981. At a worldwide level, for the relationship between DC agricultural exports and industrial imports to/from IC see N. Kaldor, "Devaluation and adjustment in developing countries", *Finance and Development*, 1983, n. 2, stressing the crucial role of political consensus in avoiding both inflationary pressures of social groups and authoritarian policies against urban wages.

54 A dissenting evaluation on UNPAAERD as African surrender to IC is made by M. Elmandjra, "Development aid as an obstacle to self-development", *Development: Seeds of Change*, n. 2-3. For a more balanced criticism on IC real engagement in UNPAAERD see T.M. Shaw, "Africa's conjuncture: from structural adjustment to self-reliance", *Third World Affairs*, 1988.

vergence on growth priority over mere debt repayment: one should note the crucial role of external aids in Africa (5.85% of GDP, 19% of total investments) despite the failure of about 50% of development projects — of which 33% only can be restored.

Critics, however, note that UNPAAERD does not include the African request for an international conference on external debt within APPER or analyze the possible ways to modify IEO; external aid is then an obstacle to development with its technocratic criteria taking no account of popular needs; it interferes with national economic priorities as a source of IC political pressure on African countries, enforces IC/DC relations instead of inter-African cooperation and South/South linkages, favours the rise of conservative pauperism in DC and constitutes principally a business for sponsors, managers and supervisors in IC⁵⁵.

For a correct evaluation of the UNPAAERD consensus, African expectations from the UN Special Session are compared with the results actually achieved.

African expectations are well pointed out in APPER:

- full African responsibility to overcome crisis;
- need for policy reforms and structural adjustments for endogenous development;
- crisis from both internal factors (short-term) and external factors (long-term) and need for international consensus with an increased amount of ODAs;
- adoption of African priorities (as outlined in APPER) in IC action toward Africa;
- shared responsibility between IC and African countries within an interdependent world.

The international response indicated an unprecedented openmindedness toward Africa, as expressed in UNPAAERD:

- adoption of APPER for transition from emergency to recovery and mid/long term development programmes;
- food and agricultural priority, with industrialization tied to agriculture;
- engagement for an increase of ODA both in quantity and quality (payment speed, cooperation, efficient use);

55 Criticism on UN Program is expressed by M. Elmandjra, 1987 and A. Cassam, "The United Nations Session on Africa in retrospect", *Development: Seeds of Change*, 1987, n. 2-3; some reserves are also shown by R. Berg, "Not the devil, but not the angel: foreign aid in Africa", *Development: Seeds of Change*, 1987. The priority of growth over debt repayment is acknowledged by J.W. Sewell/A.A. Gambino, "Prospects of implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Recovery and Development by the International Community", *Development: Seeds of Change*, 1987, n. 2-3.

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- commitment against IC protectionism to diversify exports and IC market access for African products;
 - measures favouring basic products' local transformation/commercialization/distribution;
 - an increase in IMF Structural Adjustment Facility under concessional conditions in long-run horizon;
 - more flexibility in debt relief actions;
 - commitments for raising ODAs fund (especially of IDA and ADB), avoiding net repayments to IC;
 - joint evaluation of implementation at national, regional and global levels between African countries and the international community at the United Nations forum.

External aid relevance must be coupled, however, with awareness of its actual limits (big power politics, bureaucratic reception priority in disbursements, difficult distribution at national level due to civil wars and arbitrary national policies, lack of basic needs inventory per area and uncoordinated emergency logic with recovery programmes⁵⁶).

On the other hand, one should avoid dramatically negative positions maintaining that external aid is an obstacle to self-development, showing its limits of perpetual subordination to IC with pauperism, political interference, technocracy aspects and business-orientation against South/South cooperation and without high technology supply. Major commitment from balance of payments surplus countries (West Germany and Japan) to African debt, rather than to American debt is needed; a strong recovery in USA aids — especially toward LICs — is also required, along with emergency action to repay debt and face famines, while required USSR and East Europe involvement in African development is now very unforeseeable due to their internal structural economic crises⁵⁷.

6.2. Implementation and state of realization of UNPAAERD

The consensus on Africa — with United Nations' support mobilization and WB's supply

56 For a detailed analysis of African expectations and International Community response under UNPAAERD see B.W. Mutharika, 1987.

57 On the role of external aid and international cooperation to face African crisis see the opposite views of M. Elmandjra, 1987 (African against aids view) and R. Berg, 1987. An analysis focusing on adjustment problems and international support has been made by J. Nyerere, "Some realities of adjustment: an address", *Development and Change*, 1986, n. 2 (ex Tanzanian president) and R.S. Mc Namara, "Sub-Saharan Africa: on international cooperation", *Journal of Development Planning*, n. 15, 1985.

of economic/financial assistance — has not focused on a specific implementation programme. Mobilizing financial funds (VIIIth replenishment of IDA, increase in IMF/SAF, in ADB and in OECD/DAC) poses several problems:

- lack of coordination between donor IC;
- lack of African participation in elaboration/implementation of economic policy;
- presence of IC priority (tied-aids, massive privatizations) in conflicts with African priorities;
- lack of African management and administrative controls;
- lack of implementation consequences of analyses and conferences;
- lack of positive information on African development perspectives successful realizations and potentialities;
- lack of technical assistance and project maintenance.

Measures of debt relief and aid recovery are therefore needed in a coordinated way. Priorities are: food emergency; rehabilitation and recovery of agriculture for self-sufficiency and food security (rise in production and stocks); specific hydric policies against drought and desertification; structural reforms in transports, communications, distribution and health; industry founded on plant rehabilitation; small farms; agroindustrial sector based on available resources and related to the chemical and the mechanic industries⁵⁸.

The state of implementation of UNPAAERD 1986/90 is agreedly evaluated to be in strong backwardness due to unadapt response of IC by size and coordination of aids and to net repayments to IMF. UNPAAERD demands on international situation (development-oriented context for Africa, less protectionism, economic diversification and debt relief) are mainly ignored, except for some Paris Club debt relief measures for African LICs. There is a serious risk for the agreement to prove fictitious and for political reforms to lack financial support; and the suspicion of the Lagos Plan being sold off by African countries is far from groundless⁵⁹.

58 See B.W. Mutharika, 1987 and Society for International Development (SID), "North/South roundtable on the progress of African recovery", *Development: Seeds of Change*, 1987, n. 2-3.

59 For criticism on IC crawling disengagement in UNPAAERD implementation see M. Elmandjra, 1987 from the African standpoint and P. Berg, 1987 and J.W. Sewell/A.A. Gambino, 1987 from the Western standpoint. Similar considerations are shown — with more marked suspicion on real WB and IC engagement — by A. Tarozzi, "Rapporto Subsahara: rimozioni e precauzioni", and A.M. Gentili, "Introduzione al Rapporto Subsahara", both in "Rapporto Subsahara", Asai, Roma, 1986. For a defense of WB purposes on African development see B.V.K. Jaycox, "Africa: development challenges and the World Bank's response", *Finance and Development*, 1986, n. 1. Paris Club's action for Africa is shown in T.M. Klein, "Debt relief for African countries", *Finance and Development*, n. 4, and M.J. Williams, "African debt and economic recovery: required adjustments by the IMF and donor countries", *Development: Seeds of Change*, 1987, n. 2-3. The special relationship between WB and IMF — and the way they affect debt - relief policies for Africa — are shown by H. Hino, "IMF/World Bank collaboration", *Finance and Development*, 1986, n. 1.

Developments after UNPAAERD were not so positive either: even though the increase of grant in aids, the VIIIth replenishment of IDA and partial cancellation of debt represent encouraging cooperative elements, together with internal adjustment (agriculture incentivisation, administrative reform, devaluation), the involvement of the international community in post-emergency situation in Africa seems limited. The weakening consensus, with a further fall in African export gains despite worldwide economic recovery, can lead to renewed divergence between African and Western views. The social unsustainability of the structural adjustment policies is causing a revival of the self-reliance approach under the Lagos Plan. The two positions of neo-orthodox internationalism (WB) and neo-radical nationalism (ECA/OAU) would thus reemerge to produce renewing conflicting views⁶⁰.

6.3. *Beyond UNPAAERD: African perspectives for the '90s in WB and IMF analyses*

The official Western views on African perspectives for the '90s are more optimistic than African views and even than the opinions of some Western critics as reported below.

Recent reports from the World Bank - "Africa's adjustment and growth in the '80s" (WB/UNDP) and "Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to durable growth" (WB), both issued in 1989 - analyze African economic performance in the '80s, showing a first stage of generalized decline (1980/84) followed by a stage of moderate recovery (1985/87), with arrested fall of per-capita consumption and investments, increase in agricultural production (near population growth rates) and in exports. Signs of recovery were specially manifest in 32 countries adopting structural adjustment policies (SAP) under WB and IMF supervision, despite external shocks such as the sharp fall in terms of trade post '85⁶¹.

In IMF and WB analyses the roots of African crises in the '80s did not lie only in international environment — worsened by high vulnerability and sharp concentration in few export goods — but also in internal backwardness: sectoral policies to reduce overvalued exchange rates, free agricultural prices from administrative control and privatize trade structures were partly successful, while rigidities in salaries reduction and unfavorable terms of trade movements have resulted in increased budget deficit and interest charges⁶².

An adequate industrialization strategy linked with the agricultural sector is more suitable for small labour-intensive countries and seems more realistic than high tech capital-intensive mineral resources transformation with increasing returns to scale: in this respect

60 For the emerging alternative scenarios of neo-orthodox and neo-radicals see T.M. Shaw, 1988 and A. Adedeji, 1987.

61 See C. Humphreys/W. Jaeger, "Africa's adjustment and growth", *Finance and Development*, 1989, n. 2.

62 See C. Humphreys/W. Jaeger, 1989 and S.M. Nsouli, "Structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa. The policy issues and challenges for the 1990s", *Finance and Development*, 1989, n. 3.

the Lagos strategy does not seem viable for most African countries⁶³.

The perspectives for Africa in the early '90s are based — according to a recent IMF study — on joint structural adjustment policies (supply side) and financial adjustment policies (demand side) to achieve financial stability for sustained growth. Due attention must be paid to social cost of adjustment — to be reduced by means of short-term programmes focused on employment, health and food — but also to cost of non-adjusting (currency reserve exhaustion, imports fall, income decline and poverty increase). The solution lies in implementing adjustment programmes with financial facilities to ease the social stress of reforms: for this purpose IMF has already established the Structural Adjustment Finance Facility (SAF), the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and the Compensatory & Contingency Finance Facility (CCFF) to offset net repayments trend⁶⁴.

African adjustment in the '90s is related to international environment (IC recovery, interest rates fall, more trade openness in IC) and to local reforms. Without primary goods prices shocks, IMF projections for 1989/92 show an increase in per-capita income, a reduction in budget deficit and a stop to balance of payments deficit, debt and debt services ratios increase. Mixed policies in both public and private sectors are seen as being of greatest relevance in banking, institutions and enterprises to face administrative bottlenecks and diversify economic structure within regional integration, human factor and environmental policies. The action to be taken by the international community in relation to Africa includes:

- increasing ODAs for SAP countries;
- providing multi-year support to adjustment;
- ensuring quick and simplified disbursement of ODAs;
- granting concessional terms to stop debt service ratio increase;
- coordinating external financial assistance.⁶⁵

In the WB and IMF Western view the international community side of the UNPAAERD negotiations has been kept by adapting the following measures:

- increased African share in ODA from 23% to 31% (1981/88);

63 For industrial sector see W.F. Steel, "Adjusting industrial policy in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Finance and Development*, 1988, n. 1, according World Bank view.

64 See S.M. Nsouli, 1989. On human face adjustment see J. Shaw/H. Singer, "Food policy, food aid and economic adjustment", *Food policy*, 1988, n. 2. For WB approach see P. Nicholas, "Adjustment and the poor. The role of the World Bank", *Food Policy*, 1988, n. 2; for IMF approach see P. Heller, "Fund-supported adjustment programs and the poor", *Finance and Development*, 1988, n. 4. For African case of adjustment see R.F. Hopkins, 1988.

65 See S.M. Nsouli, 1989.

-
- established special programmes for 32 African countries;
 - increased WB funds for Africa (3.9 billion USD in 1989, with a 60% share in IDA funds);
 - WB and IMF strategies taking UNPAAERD results into account⁶⁶.

The perspective of convergence seem therefore reinforced by recent recovery symptoms in Africa, evidencing an evolution in Western IOs policies concerning Africa from demand restraint (early '80s/IMF) via supply rehabilitation (early-mid '80s/WB) to human face adjustment (late '80s/WB & IMF). The shift in Western perspective can be expressed as follows:

- more focus on international situation (IC economic policies);
- more focus on exogenous situations (drought, desertification);
- focus on human factor and reduction of social cost of adjustment;
- focus shifting from specialization to structural diversification;
- focus shifting from privatization to mixed public/private sector policies;
- focus shifting from international markets to regional integration⁶⁷.

It is to be noted, however, that whereas WB maintained and enhanced its commitments to Africa, this was not the case with IMF (that exacted repayments from Africa) and with most IC bilateral financial assistance: the planned increase in ODA amounts and debt relief after the approval of UNPAAERD has taken place only partially.

The different opinions that African and Western views have of African performance in the '80s originate from different financial requirements in the World Bank FAWG to restore African import capacity to 1980/82 levels and UNPAAERD. While FAWG's minimal programme requires only 15.3 billion USD external funding per year (left aside 20 billions from export), UNPAAERD needs external financing to the extent of 23.7 to 33.6 billion USD per year in the same period. Initial results for 1986/88 show that only the WB target has been attained. In fact net resources allocation to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1986/88 rose from 19.5 to 21.9 and 25.2 billion USD in current prices — without reaching, however, the 1982 peak in constant prices at 1987 exchange rates (23.5 billions in 1988 versus 24.9 billions in 1982)⁶⁸.

66 See C. Humphreys/W. Jaeger, 1989, and — for detailed evidence — OECD, *"Financing and External Debt of Developing Countries, 1988 Survey"*, Paris 1989. For African viewpoint see A. Fall, "Esquisse du futur: un grand dessein pour l'Afrique", *Le Soleil*, Dakar, 22/11/1989.

67 The shift from neoconservative to almost socialdemocratic state prescription with economic liberalization in WB and IMF framework for Africa (with reference to the Scandinavian model) is shown by A. Fall, 1989. Human face adjustment needs a social state to ease social cost of adjustment for the poorest; see J. Shaw/H. Singer, 1988, P. Nicholas, 1988 and P. Heller, 1988.

68 See OECD, 1989. It is to be noted that about 3 billion USD each year are provided by private non-concessional sources (excluding grants from non-governmental organisations), and in 1987 net resources flow in constant prices and exchange rates fell by 0.5 billion USD from previous year level. Even including some North African countries (reported in aggregate form by North Africa/Middle East figures), the slow growth of real ODA starting from 1986 are unsatisfactory for All Africa, left aside shares amount of each country.

Thus, FAWG seems to have reached a high fulfilment rate due to its minimal targets, while the financial requirements of more ambitious UNPAAERD have not been fully met; African capacity for import is restored, but recovery is far from being consolidated.

Western commitment to Africa has increased, — despite its entity lesser than planned in UNPAAERD; unfavorable movements in terms of trade and exchange rates have, however, reduced its relevance from African view. As a result, the possibility of renewed future divergence between Western and African views on Africa does not seem too unlikely⁶⁹.

7. Conclusion: Toward a New Divergence?

African and Western countries' convergence on African development perspectives in UNPAAERD 1986/90 is the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between IC and DC (structural reforms in exchange for additional financial resources). At an inter-African social level, this consensus represents an attempt at reestablishing an independence coalition between urban and rural groups and especially between national industrializing and export-oriented bourgeoisies.

The dynamics of growing convergence in the '80s lies in a better understanding between the African and the Western viewpoint, enabling the WB mid-terms programmes to form the basis of long-term self-development strategy set forth in the Monrovia Declaration and Lagos Plan. In fact short term policies for human survival in emergency situations tend to coincide despite alternative strategies of publicly-led internal diversification & regional integration (African View) and privately-led comparative advantages specialization based on agricultural exports & world market integration (Western view). The extent of convergence appears clearly from UNPAAERD, traced from African AP-*PER* but supported even by IC. While there is a widespread consensus - along with different emphases - on symptoms of arrested development (drought, hunger, strong population growth, declining agricultural returns, falling per-capita income and rising indebtedness), prescribed strategies are a mix of internal political reforms (IC-sponsored) and pressures for a changed IEO (African-sponsored). This does not suggest a genuine

69 See A. Fall, 1989. The presence of several cases of net repayments starting from the 1986 agreement shows the low fulfilment of UNPAAERD by IC even within a framework of increased commitment to Africa. The actual use of financial resources from African countries and their involvement in structural reform policies from UNPAAERD is to be analyzed.

synthesis, but rather a simultaneous application of both views in analyzing the roots of crisis (agriculture, exchange rate levels, popular participation, public sector inefficiency, external indebtedness, urban/rural gaps) and selecting operational tools (income distributions, economic management, structural adjustments, price incentives, inter-African cooperation, ODA from IC). Within such an aggregate, differing focuses of ECA/OAU and WB reemerge in still standing divergence between agricultural output for internal consumption (self-sufficiency) and for exports (productive specialization to gain financial resources). The need for reorganization in the IEO by means of political agreement (African view) clashes with economic "laissez faire" in an evolving market-led international division of labour (Western view by WB): the commitment to adjustment undertaken by African countries against a rising amount of ODAs & a change in IEO might result in a merely unilateral action due to silent political "exit" from consensus by IC.

While the theoretical meaning of convergence show hybrid and provisional aspects arising from African emergency, convergence does not mean surrender to IC: at least in principle, many African theses are approved at UN Special Session in exchange for continuity in outward-looking trade policies. This is a very important precedent in international relations and an incentive to formulate more complex theories from originally different frameworks toward better understanding and a possible synthesis for an African development strategy.

UNPAAERD is evidently rooted in dependency theories suggesting asymmetrical interdependence in the world-system. Self-reliance, basic human needs, resource/output balance and cultural identities (social output/needs balance), however, are analyzed on the basis of an internal-backwardness concept from modernization theories. Thus, UNPAAERD provides a cooperative North/South approach to African specificity and its linkages with 'development economics', external restraint and historical origins of worldwide underdevelopment.

The World Bank analyses rest, instead, on revised modernization theories evidencing economic interdependence rather than political autonomy, specialization pattern within the international division of labour according to the level of development, material needs and limits to growth in DC. A cooperative ground in IC/DC relations thus emerges within the marginalistic paradigm despite internal constraints due to underdevelopment, which is regarded as 'natural' backwardness of traditional societies.

The provisional nature of convergence appears from specific measures: for example, convergence on narrowing rural/urban bias by favouring rural people involves divergen-

cies on the type of balance needed (pricing or structural policies first), the productive pattern (agriculture for internal consumption or for exports) and the strategic priorities to be adopted (direct food self-sufficiency versus "financial-oriented" food self-sufficiency through the path agricultural exports/currency gains/food imports sustained by food aid). The proposed mixed solutions often prove themselves unworkable in practice.

Persistent divergence stems from the two paradigms of national political autonomy even at cost of some economic inefficiency (African view) and of global economic efficiency even at the cost of some political dependence (Western view by WB and IMF). Each paradigm still stands undefeated: even in more detailed "research programmes" the progress within each paradigm becomes a real progress among paradigms only in emergency situations, where local human survival represents the agreed priority to both African and Western observers.

As a result, the perspectives of convergence look quite uncertain: simultaneous support for national basic needs policies and a more equitable IEO may turn out — considering ODA's unsatisfactory level in UNPAAERD implementation — as a simple unilateral restructuring of Africa to world economy, despite signs of recovery in SAP countries. African tendencies to radical views of the Lagos Plan self-reliance strategy might then emerge again, with some temptations of delinking from the world system in a context of renewed divergence between African and Western view which would stop any development perspective. A consensus of words rather than actions, however, might dissipate the cooperative agreement needed for common analysis and strategy on African crisis renewing conflict in perceptions, theories and policies within a growing economic disarray and human emergencies.

Only strong IC commitment to the cooperative scenario outlined in UNPAAERD 1986/90 — till now not adequately implemented — can avoid "free rider" behaviours and social conflicts in Africa, with growing divergence and widespread, catastrophic, social disintegration of African states. The dramatic worsening in the way of life of African people in the '70s and the '80s and the spread of absolute poverty due to lacking basic human needs fulfilment may in fact — if it is not stopped — lead to a turbulent and unprecedented stage of 'development of underdevelopment' both in absolute and relative sense in most regions of Africa (less social services, especially for the poor)⁷⁰.

70 For an exposition of the concept of "absolute poverty" (lacking basic human needs in food, education, health and housing) and its opposite of "relative poverty" (people with a level of income less than 2/3 of average income) in Mc Namara view as World Bank president see W. Clark, "The Mc Namara years", *Finance and Development*, 1981, n. 3.

ANALYSES ET STRATEGIES DE CEA/OUA ET DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE SUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT AFRICAIN: LES ALTERNATIVES CONVERGENTES

RESUME

Cette étude analyse la convergence insolite entre les Pays industriels (PI) et les Pays en voie de développement (PVD) au sujet de l'Afrique qui paraît dans le "Program d'Action des Nations Unies pour le redressement économique et le développement de l'Afrique, 1986/1990" (PANUREDA) approuvé en 1986 lors de la Session Spéciale des Nations Unies.

La signification et les limites de la convergence sont ramenées aux éléments suivants:

- racines de la divergence entre PI et PVD, placées dans les points de vue alternatifs (africain et occidental) et relatifs sujets sociaux;
- dynamique de la convergence depuis les interventions du FMI en Afrique dans les années '70 jusqu'aux analyses opposées du Plan Lagos (CEA/OUA) et du Agenda pour l'Action (Banque Mondiale) et aux stratégies convergentes des années '80;
- étendue de la convergence en PANUREDA par rapport aux programmes de la Banque Mondiale 1984/86 sur les symptômes, les analyses théoriques, les priorités stratégiques, les instruments opérationnels;
- signification théorique et milieu social de la convergence: les paradigmes alternatifs (efficacité économique/autonomie politique), le consentement sur les besoins humains fondamentaux et le rôle central de l'agriculture dans la restructuration économique de l'Afrique;
- perspectives de la convergence dans les années '90 entre signes de aggravation de la crise liés à limites et retards en politique d'aide des PI prévue en PANUREDA (point de vue africain) et signes de redressement liés à l'engagement accru des PI pour l'Afrique et à l'adoption des programmes d'ajustement structurel par les pays africains (point de vue occidental).

La convergence ne semble pas une synthèse réussie mais plutôt un hybride parce que en cas de solutions mixtes les "programmes de recherche" n'apportent de progrès que seulement au sein de chaque "paradigme"; alors que, dans les situations d'urgence, les perceptions conflictuelles parviennent à une synthèse constructive dans un effort de convergence opérationnelle. Seul un engagement sérieux des PI selon PANUREDA peut arrêter l'appauvrissement absolu et relatif des africains et l'affirmation d'une nouvelle divergence radicale PI/PVD africains dans un environnement de disgrégat on sociale marquée.

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
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